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Review Essay
Learning Contracts through Current Events:
Lawrence Cunningham’s Contracts in the
Real World: Stories of Popular Contracts
and Why They Matter
Miriam A. Cherry*
In his recent book published by Cambridge University Press, Professor
Lawrence Cunningham explores the nuances of contract law through
current events.1 His decision to use the contracts of modern-day singers,
actors, and entertainers to illustrate contract law principles is an inspired
choice that will appeal to today’s law students. The book guides the reader
down the well-trodden path of classic contract doctrines and applies those
classics in modern, celebrity-laden contexts. In this regard, the book reads
like an updated version of Marvin Chirelstein’s classic contracts primer 2—
an easy-to-read and clearly written commentary. Cunningham’s version
adds rollicking celebrity stories to the mix, simultaneously educating and
entertaining the reader. Both students and contract law experts will find
much here to enjoy, and find new stories that appeal as much as the old
common law chestnuts. But, perhaps because of the broad appeal and
audience to which the book is aimed, there may be too optimistic a view
about the received wisdom of contract law, inasmuch as existing doctrines
have not addressed many of the new consumer law issues raised by modern
technology.
In this review essay, I first start with a brief summary of Professor
Cunningham’s book and how I believe it will appeal to a wide audience. In
the second portion of the review, I focus on Cunningham’s thesis about
contract law, to wit, his view that contract law doctrine as it is currently
constituted has struck an appropriate balance between the formalists and
*
Professor of Law, Saint Louis University; B.A., 1996, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1999,
Harvard Law School. Thanks to Matthew Bodie, Leah Chan Grinvald, Anders Walker, and
Jarrod Wong for their helpful comments, and to Jacob Hollars for his excellent help as my
research assistant.
1
LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD: STORIES OF POPULAR
CONTRACTS AND WHY THEY MATTER (2012).
2
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(6th ed. 2010).
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realists. In other words, Cunningham argues that modern contract law
allows for the advancement of individual autonomy, but at the same time
that current doctrine allows for appropriate court intervention to police
overreaching or other problems with the bargain. In the third portion, I
explain why, despite all the best intentions of the author, I find myself only
partially persuaded by the optimistic view of existing contract doctrine.
In my view, modern technology has exacerbated many of the existing
tensions within contract law, stretching the concept of mutual assent to its
outer limits to cover methods of transacting like clickwraps and
browsewraps. Further, these tensions are not necessarily reducible to the
formalist-realist dichotomy on which Cunningham focuses. Despite this
divergence, I conclude that Professor Cunningham has taken on a subject of
surprising scope and breadth and made his obvious joy and excitement in
writing about contract law fully accessible to a wide audience. Along the
way, he holds the reader’s attention and illuminates the overarching
doctrinal themes of contract law.
I. SUMMARY OF CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD
After a general introduction to the field of contract law, as well as a list
of celebrities that the reader will meet throughout the book, the table of
contents lists contract formation, defenses, remedies, interpretation,
performance, conditions, and ends with third parties. The appropriate
organization of a contracts treatise or textbook is a matter of longstanding
debate amongst contracts scholars. Some professors begin a class by
teaching remedies, others with consideration, and others still with offer and
acceptance.3 Despite this ongoing pedagogical debate, the organizational
structure that Professor Cunningham has selected is logical and works well
even if some might prefer a different order of topics. Only on a rare
occasion was there any reason to question the book’s placement of a story
or an issue.
In the first chapter, concerning formation, the stories immediately
grabbed the reader’s attention, turning ancient questions over consideration
3

Professor Lon Fuller suggested that students begin their study of contract law with
damages, so that they would understand the consequences of what it meant to breach a
contract. See Scott D. Gerber, Corbin and Fuller’s Cases on Contracts (1942?): The
Casebook That Never Was, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 595 (2003). Other professors (myself
included), begin with contract formation, because students find it easier to understand breach
and damages if they first understand how a contract comes into existence, and what types of
promises will be legally enforced. I have often said that in some sense it does not make
much difference at what point one begins one’s study of contracts, because it all wraps
around again, like the mythical serpent eating its own tail.
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and the necessity of a bargain into a lively discussion of the ownership of
the archives of civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr.4 Reading the
chapter provides an insight into the ambiguous language surrounding those
papers left with Boston University, which had awarded him the degree that
made him “Dr. King.”5 From there, Cunningham turns his attention to
issues of offer and acceptance, mostly the question of mutual assent and
offers made in jest, based on Leonard v. Pepsico, the recent “Pepsi Points”
for a harrier jet case.6 The chapter finishes with a discussion of mutual
assent, by reviewing the Peerless ship case, Raffles v. Wichelhaus,7 and then
applying the concept of objective intent to several internet contracting
cases, including Specht v. Netscape8 and ProCD v. Zeidenberg.9
Chapters Two and Three focus on contract defenses, including
unconscionability, public policy, mistake, impossibility, and infancy.
While Chapter Two starts off with an ordinary case by way of example, the
chapter quickly moves back to more celebrity-friendly terrain. Raising
issues of the bounds of the law and unconscionability, the book discuses the
attempted blackmail of entertainer David Letterman and a palimony lawsuit
against rapper 50-Cent.10 The chapter continues with the story of a contract
to split gambling winnings—made between two octogenarian sisters.11
Finally, the Baby M case, with its multi-dimensional discussion of contracts
against public policy, rounds out the chapter.12 Chapter Three begins with a
discussion of mistake, in the context of a divorce in which a portion of the
divided joint assets disappeared in Bernard Madoff’s notorious recent Ponzi
scheme.13 Other stories in this section use celebrity contracts to great
4
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 11-14; King v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 647 N.E.2d
1196 (Mass. 1995).
5
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 12; King, 647 N.E.2d 1196.
6
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 16-18; Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc., 88 F.Supp. 2d 116,
aff’d, 210 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
7
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 26; Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375
(Ct. of Exchequer); 2 Hurl. & C. 906.
8
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 27-28; Specht v. Netscape Communications, Corp, 306
F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
9
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 28-29; ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
1996).
10
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 42, 44-47; Bill Carter & Brian Steltier, Letterman
Extortion Raises Questions for CBS, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/ 10/03/business/media/03extort.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all; Tompkins v.
Jackson, No. 104745/2008, 2009 WL513858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 3, 2009).
11
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 49-52; Sokaitis v. Bakaysa, 293 Conn. 17 (Conn.
2009).
12
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 52-58; In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
13
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 59-66; Simkin v. Blank, 80 A.D.3d 401 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2011).
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effect. For example, Cunningham’s discussion of impossibility includes
Donald Trump’s attempts to cancel a contract via a force majeure clause,14
while Craig Traylor of “Malcolm in the Middle” television fame takes
center stage in illustrating the defense of infancy.15 The chapter ends with a
discussion of the contracts and defenses in the AIG bonus scandal16 and
sports sponsorship contracts made by Citigroup and Enron.17
Chapters Four and Five turn to remedial issues, including expectation
damages, reliance damages, and restitution. Celebutante Paris Hilton plays
a major role in this discussion, as she was alleged to be in breach for
contracts for a movie promotional appearance as well as hair extension
promotions.18 Cunningham uses these examples to walk through a general
discussion of damages, which are enlivened through a recounting of some
of Hilton’s antics. The doctrine of mitigation and the lost volume seller
both receive a thorough and interesting treatment in the discussion of the
Redskins football team’s decision to pursue breaching season ticket holders,
despite the fact that some of those tickets could presumably be resold.19
The discussion of restitution revolves around the development of the hit
television show The Sopranos, and whether one of the contributors of ideas
had a right to share in the profits.20 The chapter ends with a discussion of
the off-contract remedies awarded when rock singer Rod Stewart was
unable to perform in Las Vegas due to vocal chord problems.21
Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight deal with interpretation of the contract,
the implied duty of good faith, and the effect of conditions. Rapper
14

CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 66; Trump v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 65
A.D.3d 1329 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
15
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 70; Berg v. Traylor, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 140 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007).
16
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 73-78; Lawrence A. Cunningham, A.I.G.’s Bonus
Blackmail, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/opinion
/18cunningham.html.
17
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 78-83; Richard Sandomir, Citigroup Puts Its Money
Where Its Name Will Be, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/
20/sports/baseball/20sandomir.html.
18
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 84-94; Goldberg v. Paris Hilton Entm’t, Inc., No. 0822261-CIV, 2009 WL 2525482 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2009); Hairtech Int’l, Inc. v. Hilton, No.
BC443465, 2010 WL 3300058 (Cal. Superior) (Trial Pleading) (Aug. 11, 2010).
19
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 94-99; James V. Grimaldi, Washington Redskins React
to Fans’ Tough Luck With Tough Love, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 3, 2009, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/02/AR2009090203887.html.
20
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 118-22; Baer v. Chase, No. 02-2334, 2007 WL
1237850 (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2007).
21
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 122-25; Rio Properties v. Armstrong Hirsch, 94
Fed.App’x. 519 (9th Cir. 2004); Rio Properties v. Armstrong Hirsch, 254 Fed.App’x. 600
(9th Cir. 2007).
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Eminem’s recording contract provides an excellent illustration of what
happens when a new technology—in this situation, ringtones and iTunes
downloads—is invented after the contract is signed.22 How to sort out
payment for these new technologies was the subject of a heated debate—
with Eminem’s legal fight winning him millions of dollars.23 Best efforts
clauses are illustrated in poet Maya Angelou’s disagreement with promoter
Butch Lewis over her agreement to license her poetry to Hallmark greeting
cards.24 Comedian Conan O’Brien’s dispute over the change in time of his
show is an issue that many watched closely as it unfolded, and it is used to
discuss the concept of material breach and adjustment.25 The discussion of
conditions benefits from the example of troubled actor Charlie Sheen, as it
raises questions about whether particular conditions were either waived or
estopped since the network had previously chosen to ignore his drug-fueled
antics.26 Finally, the book ends—as most contracts books do—with the
obligatory chapter about third-party beneficiaries. This portion of the book
is timely and important, thanks to its use of Wal-Mart’s ongoing labor
disputes and discussion of how third-party beneficiary doctrine might be
helpful in thinking through those issues.27 Overall, the book covers a vast
scope of issues and doctrine, inviting its readers along for an exciting
intellectual journey through the field of contract law.
II. DIFFERING VIEWS OF CONTRACT LAW, AND PROFESSOR
CUNNINGHAM’S ARGUMENT
Some would claim that contract law is revolutionary; others would argue
that it is reactionary. Compared to the status relationships of the Middle
Ages, in which economic power was primarily determined through feudal
or family relationships, contract and market relations promised a more
egalitarian alternative. In the classic text Ancient Law, Sir Henry Maine
described the radical transformation from a feudal society governed by
custom and hierarchy to one transformed by the industrial revolution, in
22
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 126-30; F.B.T. Productions v. Aftermath Records, 621
F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010).
23
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 126-30.
24
Id. at 148-52; B. Lewis Productions, Inc. v. Angelou, No. 06 Civ. 6390 (DLC), 2008
WL 1826486 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2008).
25
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 167-71; Bill Carter, Fingers Still Pointing, NBC and
O’Brien Reach a Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/
22/business/media/22conan.html.
26
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 176-86; Sheen v. Lorre, No. SC111794, 2011 WL
817781 (Cal. Superior) (Trial Pleading) (Mar. 10, 2011).
27
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 194-98; Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677
(9th Cir. 2009).
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which socio-economic mobility was not only possible, but which was
expected.28 On the other hand, there are those who would argue that
contract law acts as a reactionary force insofar as enforcing bargains strictly
as written could result in reinforcing power imbalances that already exist in
society.29
Professor Cunningham’s work notes these various arguments, and strikes
a middle ground between them. He characterizes the schism in contract law
as a dispute between formalists and the realists. This schism applies even
to foundational matters, such as the question of whether a contract has been
formed. Cunningham notes that extreme formalists would champion a
return to the days of the seal and enforce only those deals that meet the
strict definitions of offer, acceptance, and consideration.30 Realists, on the
other hand, favor scrutinizing the context of every bargain, accepting the
most informal of deals and even enforcing promises to make gifts as
contracts.31 This divide becomes both more interesting and perhaps
controversial in examining the outer limits of acceptable contracts.
Formalists, Cunningham notes, would like to see the ability of judges to
scrutinize adequacy of consideration, even purely nominal consideration,
severely circumscribed so as to expand the freedom of contract.32
Conversely, Cunningham asserts that realists would want to empower
judges fully to scrutinize not only the adequacy of consideration, but also to
police contracts that may violate a social norm, value, or policy.33 Thus the
dichotomy between formalists and realists turns into a debate over the
extent of government or court involvement in private ordering.
Cunningham walks a tightrope between these positions, often making
reference to contract law’s “sensible center,” and noting that with many
common problems, the rules that have evolved over the years make a good
deal of sense. In essence, he makes a case for the status quo, eschewing
reform in either the direction of more government interference in contract,
or government withdrawal from contract. Cunningham suggests that
current law strikes the proper balance between two rather extreme
positions.
Reading Professor Cunningham’s discussion will likely be a comforting
experience for many readers, especially law students. While formalists and
28

SIR HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1886).
See, e.g., Blake D. Morant, The Salience of Power in the Regulation of Bargains:
Procedural Unconscionability and the Importance of Context, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 925
(2006).
30
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 34.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 57.
33
Id. at 57-58, 82-83, 146-47, 212.
29
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realists may debate and bicker and try to push the law too far in one
direction or another regarding government intervention, the old wisdom of
the common law knows best. The book extols the earthy pragmatism of old
precedents and wise judges, and suggests that these doctrines will
ultimately win out and reach a balance. This soothing vision, however,
smoothes over ongoing debates among modern contract law scholars.
Modern technology, in particular, proves to be a particular challenge for the
soothing discussion.
III. MODERN TECHNOLOGY AS A CHALLENGE TO EXISTING CONTRACT
DOCTRINE
Modern technology has exacerbated the doctrinal tensions within
contract law. Currently, clickwraps and browsewraps stretch the notion of
mutual assent to its extreme, perhaps warping it in the process. The recent
literature on form contracting online has been substantial.34 While some of
this literature sees online contracting as a natural inheritance to traditional
contract law doctrine,35 other commentators have argued that contracting
online has distorted the doctrine.36
Professor Cunningham discusses the recent cases Specht v. Netscape37
and Pro-CD v. Zeidenberg38 as part of his treatment of the theme of
contract formation and mutual assent. Netscape involved an instance where
Internet users were invited to download a program without first seeing a
license agreement or any mention of one, as it was contained on a lower
part of the screen that could not be seen.39 When users alleged that the
download contained spyware and filed a lawsuit, Netscape countered by
pointing to the arbitration provision in the license.40 The Second Circuit,
per Judge Sonia Sotomayor, held that these terms were not binding, since
users did not have an opportunity to read the license and thus could not
have assented to the terms.41

34
See, e.g., Nancy Kim, Internet Challenges to Business Innovation, 12 J. INTERNET L. 3
(2008); Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of EStandard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837 (2006).
35
See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinsky, Standard-Form Contracting in
the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002).
36
See, e.g., Richard Warner, Turned on its Head?: Norms, Freedom, and Acceptable
Terms in Internet Contracting, 11 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2008).
37
Specht v. Netscape Communications, Corp, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
38
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
39
Netscape, 306 F.3d at 21-25.
40
Id. at 25.
41
Id. at 31-32.
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In Pro-CD v. Zeidenberg the Seventh Circuit, per Judge Frank
Easterbrook, held that the terms of use inside a software package—
commonly known as a shrink-wrap license—would be binding on the
purchaser, Zeidenberg.42 The court reasoned that the purchaser was on
notice that the software came with terms, even though the terms were not
revealed at the time of purchase.43 The book reconciles these conflicting
precedents in the following way:
Zeidenberg’s acceptance is analogous to download offers on the Internet,
where users are invited to click Yes to signal they accept the terms. Cases like
ProCD seemed to favor Netscape’s stance, but they actually support Netscape
users’ case. After all, in ProCD’s case, the box of software noted it was
subject to the terms listed inside. . . . These details made ProCD an easy case
on which to conclude that a contract was formed. In contrast, the Netscape
users never saw—and they could not reasonably have seen—the clause at all.
There was no chance to click No.44

This explanation is not entirely satisfactory, as Netscape and Pro-CD are
fundamentally in tension. Further, given the realpolitik of adhesion
contracts, it is difficult to say that an opportunity to “click no” would be
anything but a distinction without a difference. The fact is, these cases
conflict, and do so on a pro-business versus pro-consumer axis. In fact, two
well-known additional cases that dealt with late-arriving terms inside a
computer box, Hill v. Gateway45 and Klocek v. Gateway,46 blatantly
contradict each other, with contrary holdings on virtually identical facts.
These disputes, which are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code,
should lead to a uniform result. When instead they result in inconsistent
holdings, it only intensifies the debate about how to deal with online
contracting and adhesion contracts online.
Of course, not all commentators view online contracts of adhesion
disfavorably.47 Some authors take an explicit pro-business stance, and thus
support contracts of adhesion as assisting businesses in becoming more
efficient. Others advocate that contracts of adhesion are by nature efficient
and that cost savings will be passed along to consumers—a type of “trickle

42

ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
Id. at 1452.
44
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 29.
45
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
46
Klocek v. Gateway 2000 Inc., 104 F.Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000).
47
Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, Symposium: A Tribute to Professor
Joseph M. Perillo, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002).
43

2013 / CUNNINGHAM’S CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD

131

down” justification for the existence of the adhesion contract.48 From a
libertarian perspective, contracts of adhesion may be viewed as simply the
private ordering of the market, to be left to a laissez-faire determination.49
Still others view adhesion contracts as bad, but perhaps a necessary evil.
Some commentators point to the presence of the free market as all the
protection that consumers need. If the terms that one firm provides on its
form contract are too harsh, the consumer, after all, can choose to contract
elsewhere, at a firm offering better terms. Perhaps, if the terms are harsh
enough and demand is elastic enough, the consumer will choose to forgo
contracting altogether. To retain a competitive advantage, firms will of
necessity have to offer terms that are more-consumer friendly.
Professor Todd Rakoff’s germinal article on adhesion contracts,
however, pointed to the converse trend—the tendency of form terms to
become more entrenched, rigid, and harsh over time, despite, or perhaps
because of, the other players in an industry.50 The harsher a drafter makes
the terms, the more likely it is that other drafters in the same industry will
“borrow” the same harsh terms.51 The tendency of firms to adopt a set of
ever-harsher terms turns on its head the notion that competition will protect
the consumer’s interests.52 Unfortunately, online terms only exacerbate the
existing situation. The doctrine appears rigid, almost frozen in time.
In contrast, tort law doctrine has been capacious enough to cover related
new developments. When mass-market goods failed or caused serious
injury, plaintiffs at first attempted to bring cases via the contractual doctrine
of breach of warranty.53 These claims, however, were often stymied
because of either lack of privity or the low damages awarded in a warranty
action.54 Due to this inflexibility in contract law, plaintiffs instead looked
to tort law for redress for their injuries. Tort law was seen as less
formalistic (in the area of consumer affairs, at least),55 and plaintiffs were
48

Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—with
Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 255-58
(2006); see also Carnival Cruise Lines Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
49
Ware, supra note 48, at 259.
50
Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1228 (1983).
51
Id. at 1226-27.
52
Id.
53
William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099-1101 (1960).
54
Id. at 1128-34.
55
However, that is not the case when it comes to employment-related torts, or torts that
an employee would bring against an employer. The fellow-servant rule, as well as other
rules, served as methods that effectively prevented an employee from bringing a claim
against his or her employer. See generally MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
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able to bring lawsuits to seek recompense not only for the cost of their
defective goods, but also for compensation for their injuries. In the 1960s
Justice Roger Traynor pioneered the field of products liability, with its
subdivisions of design and manufacturing defect and its standard of strict
liability.56 Under this rubric, the plaintiff need only cover the proof of the
existence of the defect, not that the defendant knew about the concern or
that the defendant acted without a reasonable standard of care.57 In this
way tort law seems to have been more flexible in dealing with new claims
than contract law has been.
As we continue to click our way through countless EULAs and are told
that we are subject to “terms and conditions” that no reasonable consumer
has had the time to read, I maintain that we are obligated to make
changes—perhaps akin to those made in the field of torts—in order to
continue to build on the wisdom of contract law. While there is much to
celebrate in the received wisdom of ancient doctrines, we must also
recognize that it is the common law’s dynamism and adaptability that have
led to its genius.
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, Contracts in the Real World is worthwhile reading for anyone
interested in gaining a more complete understanding of contract law
doctrine. First year law students will find insights in the book’s inspired
treatment of classic cases, and they will also learn how those classic cases
can be applied to modern disputes. The book manages to be entertaining
without simplifying the issues being discussed. The only aspect of debate
is whether the book’s positive treatment of the state of current contract
doctrine is warranted in light of recent developments in online contracting.
While I might advocate for more change in the doctrine, Professor
Cunningham’s view is certainly reasonable and understandable. Overall the
book is an excellent resource for anyone who wants to learn about contract
law and leads the reader on an exciting intellectual journey.

AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1979). In fact, they did so in such an effective way that an
alternate path for bringing forward a claim, i.e. the no-fault system of worker’s
compensation, had to be developed. See Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements To
Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1997).
56
Fleming James, Jr., A Tribute to the Imaginative Creativity of Roger Traynor, 2
HOFSTRA L. REV. 445 (1974).
57
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965).

